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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Deﬁcits  in recalling  the  past  and  imagining  ﬁctitious  and  future  scenarios  have  been  documented  in
patients  with  hippocampal  damage  and  amnesia  that  was  acquired  in  adulthood.  By  contrast  patients
with  very  early  hippocampal  damage  and  developmental  amnesia  are  not  impaired  relative  to  control
participants  when  imagining  ﬁctitious/future  experiences.  Recently,  however,  a patient  (HC)  with  devel-
opmental  amnesia,  resulting  from  bilateral  hippocampal  atrophy,  was  reported  to  be  impaired,  thus
raising  a  question  about  the  true  nature  of  event  construction  in  the  context  of  developmental  amnesia.
Here,  we  assessed  HC  on a test  of imagination  which  explored  her  ability  to construct  ﬁctitious  events
or  personal  plausible  future  events.  Her scenario  descriptions  were  analysed  in detail  along  a  range of
parameters,  using  two  different  scoring  methods.  HC’s  performance  was  comparable  to  matched  con-ippocampus
utobiographical memory
emantic memory
trol participants  on  all measures  relating  to the  imagination  of  ﬁctitious  and  future  scenarios.  We  then
considered  why  she  was  reported  as  impaired  in  the  previous  study.  We  conclude  that  various  features
of  the  previous  testing  methodology  may  have  contributed  to the  underestimation  of HC’s  ability  in
that  instance.  Patients  like  HC  with  developmental  amnesia  may  be successful  at  future-thinking  tasks
because their  performance  is  not  based  on  true  visualisation  or scene  construction  supported  by  the
 on prhippocampus,  but  rather
. Introduction
Patients with bilateral hippocampal damage and amnesia have
een found to have deﬁcits not only in recalling the past but
lso in imagining ﬁctitious and future scenarios (e.g., Andelman,
ooﬁen, Goldberg, Aizenstein, & Neufeld, 2010; Hassabis, Kumaran,
ann, & Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Kurczek
t al., 2010; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; Rosenbaum, Gilboa,
evine, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2009; but see Squire et al., 2010,
nd Maguire & Hassabis, 2011 for a response. Neuroimaging stud-
es have also implicated the hippocampus in imagining ﬁctitious
xperiences (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Summerﬁeld,
assabis & Maguire, 2009, Summerﬁeld, Hassabis, & Maguire,
010) and plausible personal future episodes (e.g., Addis, Wong,
 Schacter, 2007; Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Botzung,
enkova, & Manning, 2008; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007).
The study of imagination in amnesic patients, whose damage
as acquired in adulthood from a range of aetiologies (including
noxia and limbic encephalitis), has begun to shed some light on the
ole that the hippocampus might play in supporting autobiograph-
cal memory, imagining the future, and also spatial navigation.
ne study by Hassabis et al. (2007a) found that patients were
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 20 34484347; fax: +44 20 78131445.
E-mail address: e.maguire@ucl.ac.uk (E.A. Maguire).
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impaired at imagining ﬁctitious and possible future experiences,
with their main problem being an inability to integrate their imag-
ined experiences into a spatially coherent whole, their imagined
scenarios being instead spatially fragmented. Based on this it was
suggested that perhaps autobiographical memory, imagination and
navigation are underpinned by a common core process–the abil-
ity to construct coherent scenes (‘scene construction’, Hassabis &
Maguire, 2007, 2009). An alternative theory suggests a different
account, proposing instead that imagination of the future depends
on recombined details of past experiences (‘constructive episodic
simulation hypothesis’, Schacter & Addis, 2007).
More recently, the imagination ability of patients with devel-
opmental amnesia (DA) has been examined. Such patients
sustain selective bilateral hippocampal damage as a result of
hypoxic/ischaemic episodes that occur perinatally or early in
childhood. They typically have intelligence in the normal range,
and relatively preserved semantic memory, but are amnesic for
recalling autobiographical events and have impaired spatial nav-
igation (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). Maguire, Vargha-Khadem,
and Hassabis (2010) found that one such patient, Jon (now an
adult), was  able to construct ﬁctitious and future experiences when
tested with the same scene construction task used by Hassabis et al.
Open access under CC BY license.(2007a), despite 50% volume loss in each hippocampus (Vargha-
Khadem et al., 1997). Similarly, Cooper, Vargha-Khadem, Gadian,
and Maguire (2011) used an adaptation of the same test in a group of
children (n = 21) who  had experienced neonatal hypoxia/ischaemia,
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tig. 1. Selected coronal slices of a FLASH MRI  scan in an age- and sex-matched health
ecreased in volume for HC.
nd consequent bilateral hippocampal damage of varying extent.
hey too were able to successfully construct ﬁctitious scenarios,
espite being impaired at recalling recent autobiographical events.
his was the case even for the patients with the most severe mem-
ry impairment and the greatest hippocampal volume loss. These
esults from the developmental patients are in clear contrast to
mpaired scene construction in patients with adult-acquired hip-
ocampal damage. It has been suggested that a relatively intact
emantic memory store and/or some functionality in residual hip-
ocampal tissue may  underpin this intact scene construction ability
n DA patients (Cooper et al., 2011; Maguire et al., 2010).
Findings to date seem to suggest a difference in the effects of
ippocampal pathology on future-thinking depending on whether
amage occurs in adulthood or much earlier in life. However,
nother DA patient, HC (DA6 in Adlam, Vargha-Khadem, Mishkin, &
eHaan, 2005; Adlam, Malloy, Mishkin, & Vargha-Khadem, 2009;
ase E6 in Vargha-Khadem et al., 2003) was recently reported to
e impaired at simulating personal future events (Kwan, Carson,
ddis, & Rosenbaum, 2010). The test used differed somewhat from
hat employed by Cooper et al. (2011),  Hassabis et al. (2007a), and
aguire et al. (2010),  in that there were fewer trials, a different
ype of cue was used, there was no spatial coherence measure, and
he scoring was focused on internal and external details–a legacy of
he test’s origins in the autobiographical memory literature (Levine,
voboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002). Thus the imagination
ndings in HC seem to be at odds with the other DA cases in the liter-
ture. The aim of the present study was to investigate this apparent
nomaly further.
We  did this by testing HC when she visited London. We  admin-
stered the scene construction test used in our previous studies of
dult-acquired hippocampal damage (Hassabis et al., 2007a)  and
A (Cooper et al., 2011; Maguire et al., 2010). On the basis of the
revious ﬁndings we hypothesised that HC would be unimpaired
n the task relative to age, sex and IQ matched control participants.
f this was the outcome, then it would also be necessary to try and
nderstand why Kwan et al. (2010) came to the opposite conclusion
hen testing the same patient.
. Methods
.1. Case description
HC is right-handed, female, a native English-speaker, and was 22 years old at the
ime of testing. She was born prematurely at 32 weeks of gestation, and experienced
igniﬁcant respiratory distress requiring intubation and ventilation as a neonate.
fter discharge from the hospital, HC achieved her developmental milestones nor-
ally. Memory difﬁculties and motor coordination problems were noted around
he age of 4 years, before school entry. Throughout her primary and secondary edu-
ation, HC attended mainstream schools, successfully graduating from high school;
he  went on to complete a year in technical college, and is currently working towards
 culinary degree.
At the age of 14 years 7 months, HC’s hippocampal volume reductions in rela-
ion to a control group (n = 12) of comparable age were 48.1% on the left, and 43.4%trol (left), and in HC (right). The hippocampi are outlined in black, and are markedly
on the right (Adlam et al., 2005). Measured again in the summer of 2010 (now
aged 22 years), HC’s volume reductions relative to the volumes of a large group
of  healthy controls (n = 65) were 45.3% on the left, and 44.8% on the right (see Fig. 1).
HC received neuropsychological evaluations in London at the ages of 11, 14, and 22
years. Across the three time periods, including the most recent (see Table 1), various
aspects of episodic memory and learning remained severely restricted while stan-
dards of intelligence, academic attainments, verbal ﬂuency, working memory, and
semantic memory progressed within the normal range, consistent with advances in
chronological age (see also Rosenbaum et al., in press; Vargha-Khadem et al., 2003).
2.2.  Control participants
Fourteen healthy females, who were native English-speakers, and matched to HC
on  age, IQ (Wechsler Test of Adult reading – WTAR) and handedness also participated
in the experiment. The mean age of the control group was  21.5 years (SD 1.56, range
19–24) and mean estimated full-scale IQ was  108.5 (SD 2.14, range 105–112). There
was  no signiﬁcant difference between the control participants and HC on either
of  these background characteristics (age p = 0.76; IQ p = 0.83). All participants gave
informed written consent to participation in the study in accordance with the local
research ethics committee.
2.3. Task and procedure
A detailed description of the task and the scoring method can be found in
Hassabis et al. (2007a) (see also Cooper et al., 2011; Maguire et al., 2010). In brief,
each  participant was  tested individually and the session was recorded digitally for
later transcription and scoring of participant responses. The requirements of the task
were explained to the participant and examples were given. During this practice
session, the experimenter continued until they were satisﬁed that the participant
had fully understood what was required of them. It was also established that the
patient could remember the instructions and the cues throughout a construction
trial. The scenarios purposely encompassed a variety of different subject matter
from the man-made to the natural, and the busy to the isolated to ensure there
were no content biases. Each participant completed 10 trials, 7 involving ﬁctitious
scenarios (a swimming pool, harbour, library, boardroom, derelict building, circus,
and cathedral). In three additional trials we also examined the effect of scenarios
that were explicitly self-relevant and potentially plausible in the future (possible
event during next weekend, possible Christmas event, possible future meeting with
a  friend).
For each scenario a short description was read out loud by the interviewer from
a  prepared script (e.g., “Imagine you are walking along a busy ﬁshing harbour”)
and the participant was instructed to vividly imagine the situation suggested by
the  cue and describe it in as much (multi-modal) detail as possible. Participants
were explicitly told not to recount an actual memory or any part of one but rather
create something new. A printed text card was  placed on the desk in front of the
participant containing the cue sentence to act as a reminder if needed. Participants
were allowed to continue with their descriptions until they came to a natural end or
they felt nothing else could be added. A probing protocol dictated the appropriate
use  of statements used by the examiner during the session. These mostly took the
form of general probes encouraging further description (e.g., “can you see anything
else  in the scene?”), or asking for further elaboration on a theme introduced by the
participant (e.g., “can you describe the ﬁshing boat in more detail?” in response to
the  participant saying “I can see a small ﬁshing boat gently rocking out in the sea”).
It  was strictly prohibited for the examiner to introduce any concept, idea, detail
or  entity that had not already previously been mentioned by the participant. After
each scenario, participants were asked to rate their constructions on a number of
different parameters (see Section 2.4). At various points during a trial, and prior to
the post-scenario ratings, the examiner veriﬁed that the participant still recalled the
task instructions, the scenario in question, and the scenario she had created.
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Table 1
Neuropsychological test scores for patient HC.
Cognitive domains Measures HC aged 22 years
Intelligence
Wechsler adult intelligence scale -III (standard
scores X = 100; SD 15)
Verbal IQ
Performance IQ
Full scale IQ
Verbal comprehension
Perceptual organization
Working memory
Processing speed
105
113
109
103
107
108
125
Academic attainments
Wechsler objective reading dimensions
(standard scores X = 100; SD 15)
Wechsler individual achievement test – II
(standard scores X = 100; SD 15)
Word reading
Word spelling
Reading comprehension
Mathematical reasoning
Numerical operations
103
87
121
102
99
Semantic knowledge
Letter ﬂuency (FAS) (standard scores X = 100;
SD  15)
115
Category ﬂuency (animal names & boys
names) (standard scores X = 100; SD 15)
115
British picture vocabulary scale (standard
scores X = 100; SD 15)
Total score 100
Pyramids & palm trees (raw score/52) Total score 51
Attention/executive functions
Test of everyday attention (standard scores
X  = 100; SD 15)
Map search (1 min)
Map search (2 min)
Elevator counting (EC)
EC with distraction
Visual elevator (accuracy)
Visual elevator (time)
Elevator counting with reversal
Telephone search (time)
Telephone search with counting (DT decrement)
Lottery
115
130
Normal
115
120
120
115
130
100
75
Working memory
No. of items reproduced Digit span (forward, backward)
Block span (forward, backward)
9,4
6,6
Long  term memory
Wechsler memory scale-adults (standard
scores X = 100; SD 15)
General memory
Verbal – immediate recall
Verbal – delayed recall
Visual – immediate recall
Visual – delayed recall
Delayed recognition
Working memory
49
71
46
71
59
75
105
Rivermead behavioural memory test –
extended (raw score/48)
Proﬁle score 10 (impaired)
California auditory verbal learning test
(standard scores X = 100; SD 15)
Interference
Immediate recall
Delayed recall
Learning trial 1
Learning trial 2
Learning trial 3
Learning trial 4
Learning trial 5
92
40
47
92
92
92
92
77
Design learning test – BMIPBa (raw
scores − mean (SD) for age group 16–29
years)
Design learning [total correct lines trials A1–A5, Max  45;
X = 39.6 (5.2)]
22
Design learning intrusions [total incorrect lines A1–A5;
X = 4.1(4.3)]
27
Design B Interference [total correct lines Max  9; X = 6.5
(2.0)]
4
Immediate recall [total correct lines trial A6, Max  9; X = 8.5
(1.2)]
3
Delayed recall design A (total correct lines trial A7) 0
Immediate design recall (total correct lines trials A1 + B) 8
Rey-Osterrieth complex ﬁgure test (/36;
T-score: maximum > 80/minimum < 20)
Copy (percentiles)
Immediate recall (T-score)
Delayed recall (T-score)
>16 (raw score: 36)
<20 (ﬂoor level)
<20 (ﬂoor level)
a Coughlan, Oddy, and Crawford (2007).
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Fig. 2. Scores on the Experiential Index (using the Hassabis et al., 2007a scoring
method). The data point for each control participant is represented by a black dot.N.C. Hurley et al. / Neurops
.4.  Scoring
Two  scoring methods were employed. The ﬁrst was that originally developed
nd employed by Hassabis et al. (2007a), and used in previous studies of patients
ith early hippocampal damage (Cooper et al., 2011; Maguire et al., 2010). The
econd was the scoring method used by Kwan et al. (2010) in their previous study
f  patient HC. By using both methods on the same data we  could assess the impact
f  scoring system on the results.
.4.1. Hassabis et al. (2007a) scoring
A  composite score, the Experiential Index, ranging from 0 to 60, measuring the
verall richness of the imagined experience, was  calculated from four subcompo-
ents.
Content:  Each scenario description was segmented into a set of statements.
very statement was then classiﬁed as belonging to one of the four main categories:
patial reference, entity presence, sensory description, or thought/emotion/action.
epeated statements, irrelevant details and other tangential information that could
ot be classiﬁed into one of these four categories were excluded. Extensive pilot
tudies indicated that the production of seven details per category was  an optimal
eﬂection of performance while ensuring that those with more circuitous descrip-
ions  were not unfairly advantaged. Thus, the score for each details category was
apped at a maximum of 7.
Participant ratings: Two subjective self-ratings contributed to the Experiential
ndex, each varying on a scale from 1 to 5: sense of presence (1 – ‘did not feel like I was
here at all’; 5 – ‘felt strongly like I was really there’) and perceived salience/vividness
1  – ‘could not really see anything’; 5 – ‘extremely salient’).
Spatial Coherence Index: As part of the feedback on each scenario, participants
ere presented with a set of 12 statements each providing a possible qualitative
escription of the newly constructed experience. Participants were instructed to
ndicate the statements they felt accurately described their construction. They were
ree to identify as many or as few as they thought appropriate. Of the 12 statements,
 were ‘integrated’ and indicated that aspects of the scene were contiguous (e.g., ‘I
ould see the whole scene in my  mind’s eye’) and 4 were ‘fragmented’ and indicated
hat aspects of the scene were not contiguous (e.g., ‘It was a collection of separate
mages’). One point was awarded for each integrated statement selected and one
oint taken away for each fragmented statement. This yielded a score between −4
nd +8 that was then normalised around zero to give ﬁnal Spatial Coherence Index
core ranging between −6 (totally fragmented) and +6 (completely integrated).
ny construction with a negative Spatial Coherence Index was considered to be
ncoherent and fragmented.
Quality judgement:  The ﬁnal scoring component was the scorer’s assessment of
he  overall quality of the construction. Scorers were instructed to rate how well they
elt the description evoked a detailed ‘picture’ of the experience in their own  mind’s
ye. Quality ratings could range from 0 (indicating the construction was  completely
evoid of details and with no sense of experiencing) to 10 (indicating an extremely
ich and highly evocative construction that appeared to emerge from an extremely
ivid imagining).
Several other ratings were also taken. After imagining each new experience,
articipants rated how difﬁcult they found this on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 – very
asy  . . . 5 – very difﬁcult). They were also asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 its similarity
o  an actual memory, in whole or in part (1 – nothing at all like any memories . . . 5
exactly like a memory).
A  series of scenarios (15%) were randomly chosen and scored blindly by a sec-
nd scorer. To measure inter-rater reliability, the Cronbach’s Alpha test of internal
onsistency was performed on the two  raters’ scores, which revealed excellent
nter-rater reliability over all sub-components, both with and without the quality
udgement included (in both cases  ˛ = 0.97).
.4.2. Kwan et al. (2010) scoring
Kwan et al. (2010) used the standard scoring procedure from the autobiograph-
cal interview (AI) devised by Levine et al. (2002) when assessing the four personal
uture events they had HC construct. In order to make a close comparison with Kwan
t  al. (2010), we took the three of our scenarios that related to personal future events
nd scored them using the AI method.
Each future scenario was segmented into details, where a detail was deﬁned as
 unique occurrence, observation or thought. All details were then categorized as
ither internal or external. Internal details were those that pertained directly to the
entral event described by the participant, were speciﬁc to time and place, and were
onsidered to reﬂect episodic experiencing. Internal details were separated into ﬁve
ategories: event, time, place, perceptual and emotion/thought. External details
ere non-episodic details that were tangential or unrelated to the central event.
hese included details from other events, semantic facts, repetitions, or metacogni-
ive statements/editorializing. Details for each category were tallied and averaged
cross the three future scenarios to form internal and external composite scores for
ach participant.Each scenario also received qualitative ratings from the scorer for episodic rich-
ess  (0–6), time (0–3), place (0–3), perception (0–3), and emotion/thoughts (0–3)
see Levine et al., 2002 for descriptions). These scores were tallied and averaged
cross the three scenarios to determine an overall composite of qualitative ratings
maximum = 18) for each participant. A rating of time integration (0–3) was alsoThe  vertical bar signiﬁes the group mean of the controls. The data point for patient
HC  is represented by a red star. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
assigned to each scene, but was not included in the ratings composite, in line with
the Levine et al. (2002) protocol. As with the Hassabis et al. (2007a) scoring method,
a  series of scenarios (20%) were randomly chosen and scored by a second scorer. To
measure inter-rater reliability, the Cronbach’s Alpha test of internal consistency was
performed on the two  raters’ scores, which revealed excellent inter-rater reliability
over  all components, and for internal, external and ratings separately (in all cases
˛  = 0.99).
2.5. Data analysis
In order to compare patient HC to the group of 14 controls, we used a modiﬁed
t  test (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002; Crawford & Howell, 1998). This test treats an
individual patient as a sample, affording the comparison of the patient and a small
control group. All results are two-tailed with a signiﬁcance threshold of p < 0.05.
3. Results
3.1. Data scored using the Hassabis et al. (2007a) scheme
The performance scores for HC and the control group, and sta-
tistical comparisons between the two, are summarised in Table 2.
There was no signiﬁcant difference between HC and the controls on
the overall Experiential Index. This is illustrated further in Fig. 2,
which clearly shows that HC performed within the mid-upper
range of the control participants. Similarly, she performed com-
parably to controls on the sub-component measures of content.
Analysis of uncapped measures of content (i.e., not restricted
to seven details per category) also showed that HC’s scores were
unimpaired in all four categories–spatial references (t(13) −0.18,
p = 0.86), entities present (t(13) −1.01, p = 0.33), sensory descrip-
tions (t(13) −1.15, p = 0.27) and thoughts/emotions/actions (t(13)
−0.63, p = 0.54).
HC’s overall quality judgement score (given by the scorers) was
not signiﬁcantly different from the controls (see Table 2). When the
quality judgement component was excluded from the Experiential
Index, the overall score remained comparable to that of the control
group (t(13) 0.33, p = 0.75), showing this subjective scorer rating
did not inﬂuence the Experiential Index signiﬁcantly.
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Table 2
Performance on the imagination task scored using the Hassabis et al. (2007a) method.
Mean HC Mean (SD) Controls (n = 14) t Value p Value (2-tailed)
Overall richness
Experiential Index 47.54 48.10 (2.98) −0.18 0.86
Sub-components
Content
Spatial references 4.70 4.81 (1.19) −0.09 0.93
Entities present 6.90 6.91 (0.11) −0.09 0.93
Sensory descriptions 6.10 6.87 (0.23) −3.23 0.007*
Thoughts/emotions/actions 6.40 6.79 (0.33) −1.14 0.27
Participant ratings
Perceived salience 4.20 3.76 (0.44) 0.97 0.35
Sense of presence 4.30 3.64 (0.41) 1.56 0.14
Spatial coherence
Spatial Coherence Index 4.70 3.74 (1.17) 0.79 0.44
Scorer rating
Quality judgement 6.80 7.51 (0.71) −0.97 0.35
Other ratings
Task difﬁculty 1.50 2.27 (0.43) −1.73 0.11
Similarity to real memories 1.70 2.04 (0.52) −0.63 0.54
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ﬁ* Note that the difference between HC and controls on sensory descriptions was
he  other nine trials, there was no signiﬁcant difference on this (t(13) 0.77, p = 0.45)
HC’s score on the Spatial Coherence Index was  also indistin-
uishable from controls (see Table 2 and Fig. 3).
There were two types of scenario, ﬁctitious and personal future.
ean Experiential Index scores for the ﬁctitious experiences [HC:
9.69; controls 48.55 (3.66)] were not signiﬁcantly different (t(13)
.30, p = 0.77). This was also the case for the Spatial Coherence Index
HC: 4.57; controls: 3.80 (1.16); t(13) 0.64, p = 0.53.] Fig. 4 provides
xcerpts from HC and an example control participant for a ﬁctitious
cenario.
Mean Experiential Index scores for the personal future experi-
nces [HC: 42.53; controls 47.07 (3.06)] were also not signiﬁcantly
ifferent (t(13) −1.43, p = 0.18). This was also the case for the Spa-
ial Coherence Index [HC: 5.00; controls: 3.60 (1.56); t(13) 0.87,
ig. 3. Scores on the Spatial Coherence Index (using the Hassabis et al., 2007a scoring
ethod). The data point for each control participant is represented by a black dot.
he  vertical bar signiﬁes the group mean of the controls. The data point for patient
C  is represented by a red star. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
gure legend, the reader is referred to the web  version of this article.)n by one trial. When this trial was removed and the analysis was performed using
y other measure.
p = 0.40]. Fig. 5 provides excerpts from HC and an example control
participant for a personal future scenario.
There was  no difference between HC’s self-ratings and those
of the control participants for perceived salience/vividness, sense
of presence, task difﬁculty and similarity to real memories (see
Table 2). The task was  rated as easy by HC and controls, and con-
structed scenarios were also rated by participants, including HC, as
being dissimilar to real memories.
3.2. Data scored using the Kwan et al. (2010) scheme
Mean scores and details of the statistical comparisons between
HC and the control group on future imagined scenarios using
the AI scoring procedure are summarized in Table 3. Analysis
revealed that there was  no signiﬁcant difference between HC and
the controls on either quantitative (internal and external detail
composites, see also Fig. 6A) or qualitative (ratings, see Fig. 6B)
scores. HC performed within the lower range of the control partic-
ipants on internal details, and in the middle range of the controls
on external details and on the ratings score.
4. Discussion
Previous studies of patients with bilateral hippocampal damage
and amnesia have documented impairments in imagining ﬁcti-
tious and future experiences (Andelman et al., 2010; Hassabis et al.,
2007a; Klein et al., 2002; Kurczek et al., 2010; Maguire & Hassabis,
2011; Race et al., 2011; Rosenbaum et al., 2009). In contrast to
these patients whose hippocampal damage was acquired in adult-
hood, patients who sustained very early injury to their hippocampi
and have developmental amnesia were found to have intact ability
to construct scenarios (Cooper et al., 2011; Maguire et al., 2010).
However in a recent report on one of the DA patients (HC) in our
Table 3
Performance on the personal future event scenarios scored using the Kwan et al.
(2010) method.
Mean HC Mean (SD)
Controls
(n = 14)
t Value p Value
(2-tailed)
Details
Internal 28.33 37.19 (8.75) −0.98 0.35
External 6.33 4.90 (3.85) 0.36 0.73
Ratings 11.00  12.40 (2.47) −0.55 0.59
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Cue: Imagine you’re  standing in  fr ont  of  a lar ge circus  ten t 
HC: Okay,  it's a big, like, the big  top, so there's, like, red and white stripes.  And then the door of the tent 
is open, so  there's l ike a  li ttle triangle and the fl aps are being he ld open.   There is li ke a million of 
scre aming kids running al l over  the place with their balloons an d they're not lookin g where they're going 
and they're like running into things a nd their  parents are wa y far back going,  “be  good, Johnny, keep 
going”, like  they sometimes d o.  Um,  you can look,  you ca n just see the  ins ide of the flap and you can hear 
the music real ly  loud.  And they haven't even got there  yet, but it's real ly loud.   And you can see an 
elephant when you, like,  through the litt le flap,  you ca n see an  elepha nt.   And  outsi de the circus  tent,  
there 's a man standing there in, li ke, a blac k suit  and he 's  a black guy , he's kind of cree py looking. But, um, 
and he's, like,  he's push… li ke, not pushing,  but  openi ng the t ent and letting all the little kids in.  And I 
think he 's collecting tickets  or he's… I  do n't really know what he's doing there, but  he's just standing t here 
and he's…  he's part of the circus,  but  he 's  not the ringmaster, I don't think, but he's  just  there.  Um, so you 
can hear all the an imals in the inside and the  music an d there's, li ke, seagull s flying overhead.  And it's the 
middle  of summert ime and there's, li ke,  big oak trees all around the tent and the area.  For  some reason, 
there's no traile rs.  I do n't  kn ow wher e the tr ailers  are,  but  they're not  the re.  And  th en th ere's like a… I'm 
on a, li ke, a gravel, dirt pa th… pathwa y that  leads…  like, I'm in  the middle , all  the parent…  yelli ng parents 
are behind me, the  kids  are all in th e tent and the n I  am in bet wee n. 
Con: It ’s  a summ er’s  day and I’m on  a field  and a circus  tent’s in front of me.   It’s really tall and it’s red 
and white striped.  There ’s loads  of people milling ar ound, walking past  me, but I’ m standing on my own 
looking in, but I can’t  see fully into the tent because the gaps  for  the doors are on ly small .  But I can hear 
the music c oming out of it and pe ople  cheering.  There’s a bit of a wind blowing and it’s  blowing the sides 
of the tent a little bit, but it’s still qui te  warm.   And  the sun’s shining down on it and you can see that the 
tent’s  qui te d irt y. Ah, if I look aro und I can see  a stage and some  other tents, but the circus tent’s the 
big gest one.  But  the  lo udest  noise is the  music  co ming ou t of  it,  an d then  jus t the sou nd of  peo ple talking  
as the y walk  past  me . Um, I can ’t se e what ’s on  the  othe r stage s bec ause they’r e qui te far awa y, but  I can 
hear musi c co ming  from the m as  well.   And  cr owds st anding…  an d I can see  crowds  st andin g in  fro nt of 
them.  But the circus tent is the main at trac tion there . 
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eries (DA6 in Adlam et al., 2005; patient E6 in Vargha-Khadem
t al., 2003), Kwan et al. (2010) observed that imagination of future
xperiences in HC was  impaired. Having evaluated HC, we now
eport that we found her to be unimpaired on measures relating
o imagined ﬁctitious events and personal plausible future events.
his ﬁnding is consistent with previous cases of early hippocampal
amage who performed normally, and in contrast to adult-acquired
ases of bilateral hippocampal damage who did not. Given this dis-
repancy in ﬁndings when two different research groups evaluated
he same patient, the question arises as to the possible reasons for
uch a difference? Assuming that HC was not having a bad day dur-
ng testing in Ontario, and a good day during testing in London, then
he obvious disparity is in the tests that were employed.
.1. Key features of the two testing protocols
Kwan et al. (2010) used a test with four trials all relating to per-
onal future events, each trial being initiated by a single cue word
e.g., “coffee”). Participants were required to use the cue to help
hem to generate a scenario. They also had to adhere to another
nstruction, namely, on some trials they had to create an event that
ould occur in the next few weeks, and on others, in the next few
ears. The time limit for each trial was 5 min. The construction of
uture events was performed as part of a larger task where recall
f remote and more recent autobiographical events was  tested in a
imilar manner. The verbal output of the tasks was  divided by the
corer into two categories, internal and external details, approxi-
ately equivalent to episodic and semantic details. Each event was
lso given qualitative ratings by the scorer for episodic richness,
ime, place, perceptual, thought/emotion and time integration.at the top. HC = the patient; con = one of the control participants. Of note, HC has no
Several ratings were also made by participants concerning vivid-
ness, emotionality and personal signiﬁcance on each trial.
The task we used had ten trials, seven of which involved creation
of general ﬁctitious scenarios, and three concerned personal plausi-
ble future experiences. For the former, the cues were one sentence
long (e.g., “Imagine you are standing in front of a large circus tent”).
In the case of the future scenarios, the cues were non-speciﬁc (e.g.,
“Imagine the next time you will meet a friend”/“Imagine something
you will be doing this weekend”/“Imagine how you will spend next
Christmas”). There was  no time limit, although typically no trial
lasted beyond 5 min. Scoring was  as described in Table 2, where
the number of items within four content categories was  calcu-
lated. There was  also a set of participant ratings including vividness
(salience), sense of presence, difﬁculty and similarity to real mem-
ories. In addition, participants scored the spatial coherence of their
imagined scenario. Finally, the scorer gave an overall assessment
(quality judgement) of how well they felt the description evoked a
detailed picture of the experience in their own  mind’s eye.
4.2. Possible reasons for the discrepant results
Perhaps the difference in trial number is the reason for the dis-
crepancy between our ﬁndings and those of Kwan et al. (2010).  It
could be argued that with just four trials, they may  have lacked
sufﬁcient power to sample HC’s performance. However, we  believe
this is an unlikely explanation, because if one considers our three
personal plausible future event trials, which are most comparable
to the Kwan et al. (2010) task, then we see no impairment in HC
compared with controls, thus the same results pertained with ten
trials or three trials.
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Cue: Imagine how you will  spe nd next Christ mas  
HC: We're all at  my aun t's  house in  the middle  of  nowhe re beca use she liv es in  the  bush.  And  th ere's snow 
everywhe re and, u m,  parts  of  my aun ts and uncles  are … a lot  of them are  in the  livi ng roo m, some of th em 
are  just  show ing up n ow.  Me and my famil y hav e alread y been  there  for  a whil e.  Eve ryone's  talking  and  
ever yone's… when  we  all  get  togethe r, we  all  talk  an d it  gets lou der  and louder  and louder .  So we're all 
getti ng qui te loud.   My aunt's not arou nd because someth ing's burning, so she  ha s to try and fix that and it's 
sta rting  to  smell .  So she's worried abo ut that .  The lit tle k ids are all in the living room with us... One of  
them's gone to find my aunt , to find out  wha t… if she wan ts any help.  Oh, my mom's  in the kitchen wi th 
my au nt trying  to help  get  din ner  together.   Um, I'm sitti ng down becaus e I've bee n told  to get out of  the 
way.  Yes, the rest of the family's in the li ving room, so there's,  like , a big couch and two chairs and a big 
glass window on  the one  side and there 's like an end tabl e with a la mp.   But, for  some reason, she repainted, 
so it's  pu rple.  And then  the kit chen is , lik e, big  gla ss windows on  each  side  be cause,  I guess,  she moved.   So  
there 's big glass windows an d the stove 's in the middl e.  And it's starte d to smell like  Christmas dinner  and 
burnt combined. 
Con: I have miss ed my flight home for Ch ristmas beca use of the snow and  I'v e gotten  to the airport and 
ever ythi ng  and the snow's so bad but  there is , I miss  my  flight  bec ause the  flight do esn 't  go.  So I'm,  I'm 
stuck in the city  all by myself, ever yone  else is at home and I'm here, but I still decide to ha ve a Christmas 
by myself.  So I go  out the  evening before on Chr istmas E ve and I go shopping and I try to look for stuff f or 
my favourite kind of dinner  to have on C hri stmas Day.  So I would go out and,  and I'd bu y all the 
ingredients for Chris tmas dinner,  not  a  full turke y but maybe some  other turkey, potatoes, stuffi ng, 
vegetables, everythi ng.  And  then  on Christmas morning I wake up and I th ink  I'm at home, but I'm not,  and 
I get  up.  The house is very  quiet.   There is no one there  because  everyone has g one  home.  I turn on the 
radio, it's full  of C hristmas cheer  and  Santa's come to ever yone.   Then I start making the dinner, it takes me 
a lot of the  day and then I  eat it and then I just end up  watching a  lot  of TV for the  day and just eating lots of 
stuff.  Yea h, I'm in  the hous e that..  in  just a house.  I'm in  the  kitchen  so the  ra dio  is  on, so it's quite  loud.   
There's a wooden tab le, th ere's lots  of  chai rs at  the table  but  there 's no  one els e at th em. There's a wo oden 
floor .  It's very  warm, ver y,  very warm because out side the window it's very bright.   It's,  it's, erm, night time 
outside but  you  can see  the moon, i t's a very clear even ing and the moon is reflecting off all the sn ow tha t's 
outside so it's maki ng outside look ve ry white.  It's ve ry cold out there but it's warm inside . 
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The next obvious difference between the two tasks is how
hey were scored. Kwan et al.’s (2010) main scoring comprised a
ategorical distinction between internal and external details, sup-
lemented by a range of scorer judgments. By contrast, we  counted
p the number of details in four content categories, and had one
corer rating (quality judgement). In our case, the overall results
emained the same with or without this subjective scorer rating.
nfortunately Kwan et al. (2010) did not include example tran-
cripts from HC and controls, which would have been helpful in
rder to examine the data more directly. Nevertheless, when we re-
cored our personal future scenario transcripts using the scheme
f Kwan et al. (2010) (taken from Levine et al., 2002), while HC
as at the lower end of the control range for internal details, there
ere no statistically signiﬁcant differences between HC and the
ontrol participants for internal details, external details or ratings.
iven that the same (unimpaired) result pertained irrespective
f the scoring method used suggests this may  not be the rea-
on for the disparity between our data and those of Kwan et al.
2010).
Another difference between the two tasks that may  be particu-
arly critical is the nature of the cues. Kwan et al. (2010) employed
ingle words as cues, while we used one-sentence cues. Single word
ues may  force a participant to both construct a scenario and then
laborate upon it. This distinction between event construction and
laboration was initially suggested by Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, and
hitecross (2001); see also Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross,
nd Sharpe (2003),  and subsequently adopted by Addis et al. (2007).
onstruction is described by Kwan et al. (2010) as the creation
f a future event, and elaboration as the subsequent imagining ofpts with the cue at the top. HC = the patient; con = one of the control participants.
supplementary details. Leading on from this distinction, it could be
argued that our one-sentence cues provide the basic scene/scenario
and what was then required by HC was  the mere elaboration of that
scene, thus our cues eschewed the need for actual scene construc-
tion. Using this logic it could be concluded that perhaps testing of
HC highlights a distinction whereby event construction is impaired
in the context of hippocampal amnesia while event elaboration is
intact. However, there are a number of problems with this argu-
ment.
While the cues for our general ﬁctitious scenarios typically con-
tained a speciﬁc spatial context and primary content cues, this was
clearly not the case for our future-oriented scenarios. In those tri-
als the cues did not contain any spatial context or any key content
cues and were clearly non-speciﬁc (e.g., “Imagine something you
will be doing this weekend”). Not only does the participant have
to generate a speciﬁc scenario idea, but she then has to construct
it, and subsequently elaborate upon it. Nevertheless HC was still
able to perform comparably to the control participants on these
non-speciﬁc cue trials. Incidentally, if the argument is that provi-
sion of speciﬁc cues somehow helps to circumvent the construction
problem in hippocampal amnesia, then why are patients with bilat-
eral hippocampal damage and amnesia acquired in adulthood so
impaired on our task (Hassabis et al., 2007a)? The speciﬁc cues for
the ﬁctitious scenarios clearly did not help them. Indeed even when
they were provided with a speciﬁc cue and all of the elements they
would need to construct an appropriate scenario, they were unable
to do so, their problem instead being an inability to integrate the
imagined scenario into a spatially coherent whole (Hassabis et al.,
2007a).
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Instead, we suggest that the key issue may  be with Kwan et al.’s
(2010) use of very speciﬁc single word cues (e.g., “coffee”). These
cues highly constrain the participant, making the task difﬁcult,
loading on strategic searching as opposed to event construction
(see also Kwan et al., 2010 for more on this). Add to this considera-
tion of two other factors – the additional requirement in the Kwan
et al. (2010) study to produce an imagined scenario appropriate to
a speciﬁc future time period, and the fact that this task was con-
ducted as part of a test of recalling past autobiographical events –
and we suggest this may  have been too much for amnesic patient
HC to keep track of. We  believe that Kwan et al.’s (2010) results
were possibly inﬂuenced by difﬁculties associated with the cue,
and the attendant test context, that any patient with brain injury
might ﬁnd challenging.
4.3. Imagination in the context of developmental amnesia
HC was  unimpaired at the construction of ﬁctitious and future
experiences using our paradigm. This ﬁnding is consistent with
other reports in the literature of patients with early hippocampal
damage (Cooper et al., 2011; Maguire et al., 2010). It is possible
that the remnant hippocampal tissue in patients like HC retains
some functionality, sufﬁcient to support a form of basic scenario
construction, but not enough for the reconstruction of detailed
trial unique autobiographical events that are precisely marked in
space and time. Future fMRI studies will be needed to examine this
issue. Alternatively, patients with developmental amnesia, includ-
ing HC, who have developed normal intellectual status, and have
acquired a wealth of world knowledge, may  rely on their semantic
memories to construct scenarios. Thus, patients with developmen-
tal amnesia may  be successful at future-thinking tasks because
their performance is not based on true visualisation supported
by the hippocampus, but rather on preserved world knowledge
and a sense of familiarity with how future events logically unfold.
Another DA patient, Jon, described his ability to construct scenar-
ios as something that he had worked on over the years, that is
was  effortful and did not come automatically or naturally (Maguire
et al., 2010). Interestingly, HC was unable to describe exactly how
she constructed the scenarios, which was in contrast to her con-
trols who  reported two clear strategies, visualising of the initial
spatial context and then populating this with relevant detail, or
seeing part of the full scene and then mentally scanning around
which allowed further aspects of the full scene to come into view.
Given that DA patients sustained such early hippocampal dam-
age, well before hippocampal-dependent memory functions had
emerged, and have never known what it is like to truly visualise a
scene or recreate an event in the mind, then in the absence of any
comparator, it is perhaps not surprising that they consider their
constructions to be coherent, and rate them as such. They are also
very accustomed to relying on their world knowledge and semantic
representations day to day, perhaps doing so much more readily
than the adult-acquired cases of hippocampal damage, who are
acutely aware of the devastating change that has occurred in their
ability to imagine scenes pre and post lesion.
To conclude, in this study we attempted to understand why
patient HC, with developmental amnesia, was reported to be
impaired at imagining the future (Kwan et al., 2010), contrary to
other cases of early hippocampal damage reported in the litera-
ture (Cooper et al., 2011; Maguire et al., 2010). When we tested HC
we found she performed similarly to control participants, a ﬁnd-
ing that is at variance with the prior report by Kwan et al. (2010)
on this patient. We  suggest that various features of the Kwan et al.
(2010) testing methodology may  have contributed to the under-
estimation of HC’s ability in that instance. Future studies will be
needed to explore in greater detail the effect on scene construc-
tion of different types of cues, test conditions, and strategies in
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oth developmental and adult-acquired amnesia. Overall, our study
llustrates that a form of scenario construction may  be possible that
s not hippocampal-dependent and not based on true visualisation
f space and scenes, and this option might become viable/likely
hen semantic representations of the physical world can be rel-
tively spared as is the case in developmental amnesia. In future
tudies it will be important to compare different forms of construc-
ion, and in particular, to understand any consequences that might
rise when the hippocampus is not involved.
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